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Why Thailand’s political situation is “chaos”?

At the beginning, conflict of Thailand is just individual conflict of interest between some interest group and some political party. Afterwards, the conflict can’t be compromised by private negotiation and magnify outcomes to public resistance. Then, this “private opposition of interest” was transformed to “Identical conflict of public”. From theoretical background said, identical conflict can be solved by “voting” as figure 1 tells you.

Figure 1: Description about conflict of identical outcomes which have to be compromised by voting

However, in this Thailand case, why we can’t fine tune together with election?

Firstly, answer of above question which is asking about non-accommodation of Thailand’s political market is “non-operational of exchange function between public policy and vote”. If this transaction is disordered, both of general election and voting process are not have significant effect to compromise conflict between interest groups. Causation of this un-function of policy exchange market is “Vote buying” which People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used to use as main reason of rejection about TRT’s legitimacy. This problem also still root on Thailand because of 3 mains sub-factors

1) Bad contract design lead to non-credible law enforcement and temp to buying vote with low chance to be investigated by authorities. This guess bases on prisoner dilemma theorem and (static) game theory analysis. Moreover, indirectly, this sub-factor can be created by bad legislatures (representative of House) too.

2) Political market transaction between voter and political party is future market without cost of cheating. Previous sentence means, this political market is tempt to cheat and voter has high uncertainty or certain at expected value of policy transaction equal to zero. Then, surely, current cash may attractive than future policy.

3) Experience about low productivities government given adaptive expectation lead to zero expected value of vote (barter trade with policy) as above factor. So, rational voter should choose money than policy. (Note: 1.2-1.3 can be explained by simple Principle of Expected Utility)

Secondly, I call, rational coup theorem given game theory conceptual framework. At an introduction of this paper I told you about “conflict of interest groups and political party”. These part, I will analyze deeper. The first interest group that I focus in this analysis is “Democrat party + Bureaucratic system + elder capitalist (Banker + others)”. Second group is “Thai-Rak-Thai, briefly, TRT (no matter what its name was changed such as Palung-Prachachon or Puea-Thai) which cooperate with new capitalist (Telecommunication + Automobile + Multi-National Company), Poverty who never touch about “public policy” in elder political structure and police institution.

On surface of this competition, competitive field is not flatted because of expected chance of Democrat’s winning is very lower than TRT (because supporter of TRT is poverty groups who are the majority of Thailand). So, It’s not wondering to say, this situation is nearly unique equilibrium at TRT (and its group of interest) take all and Democrat (and also its group too) loose all continuously.

Figure 2: Description about conflict practical outcomes which can’t be compromised by voting

Then, co-party that has relative interest with Democrat party (or may has disagreement with TRT) such as military organization has rational tempting to destroy this “game” with wild power as general word call “Coup”!!!

Thirdly, former reason especially for second reason is not affect or happen if… Thailand’s political institution is strong and has professional discipline enough . So, I guess, the third weakness that lead Thailand’s political path to rough line is “Lack of good institutional design”. At least, some topics have to have consensus such as no coup! No illegal action! Along competitive lane given fair regulation or others supplement public contracts.

Fourthly, after succession of coup, a lot of specific intention law and some institution who can use judicial power in active function (footnote: In ordinary case, judicial power have to be stand as passive power organization only because this institution has high power which relate to basic right. So, this institutional power should be limited) was created. All of this new political instrument that are happened from member of coup’s intention distorted competitive field and lead to more identical conflict and more polarization between 2 groups of perspective.

On one hand think, this new political regulation is healthy unfair that help to diverge TRT (bad product) out of market. However, on the other hand, TRT have no more trust about official competition. So, TRT budded and mobilized its people into the road as PAD use to do with TRT.

All of 4 reasons that I told you in this paper are brief history of Thailand chaos in my own perspective (in fact, I have more than this hypothesis. However, other hypotheses are viewed with others conceptual framework. So, it’s going to be better if we will discuss about the others in later paper) without individual conflict. Naturally of honesty words that can be heart someone but I would like to tell you all, I never judge player in this paper as my own emotion but model and framework base only. Readers can be against my view, can be play as intellectual opponent and I challenge you to do it! Please do it!

Finally, this paper is just explaining about causation of Thailand’s chaos in political market but is not driving to method of solving. Later paper, series 2, I will show you about basic to sophisticate tool which can solve this problem for you.